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SYMPOSIUM
LAW AND THE AGED
FOREWORD: LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS FOR THE ELDERLY
George J. Alexander*
Grow old along with me!
The best is yet to be,
The last of life for which the first was made.
Robert Browning1
Browning was a hopeless romantic. Huxley was more accurate
when in Brave New World he had society cheerfully carting off the old to
the neighborhood crematorium.2 As a practical matter, the old are a mi-
nority group, probably the least militant minority group in the country,
although they have more to be militant about than many others. Their
superior claim to being disgruntled is related to their entry into the
group. For most minority group members entry is both instantaneous
and permanent. One is born Black, Chicano, illegitimate. Whatever so-
cietal disadvantage is visited on those minorities arrives early and is
continuous. The hope for escape is virtually nonexistent. Indeed, a
useful way of defining a minority group in need of special legal protec-
tion is by examining the immutability of its membership;3 the more
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara. A.B. 1953, J.D. 1959,
University of Pennsylvania; LL.M. 1964, J.S.D. 1969, Yale. Member of the California,
Illinois, and New York bars.
1. Rabbi Ben Ezra, in 4 WoRKs OF ROBERT BROWNING 261 (Cambridge ed. 1966).
2. A. HuXLEY, BRAvE NEW WoR.D 237-48 (1946).
3. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Fron-
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immutable, the more the need for protection. Old people come by
their second-class status late in life and it is at once more shocking and
more terrible because it is unaccustomed.
So great is the fear of aging in this youth culture that psychologi-
cal barriers are created against the recognition that we grow old. As
packing the dying off to hospitals allows others to avoid a recognition
of their own mortality, 4 so thinking of the old as "them" sustains an
illusion of eternal youth. The unfortunate result of this self-delusion,
however, is a basic rejection of those excluded.5 The youth focus, how-
ever, is not entirely to blame for the social mistreatment that accelerates
with age. Two other catastrophic events play a major part. The first
is a conjunction of galloping inflation and accelerated taxation of in-
come and inheritance. Those forces together guarantee that most
people will have to live from income rather than from their own savings,
let alone the savings of prior generations. Yet, income is routinely di-
minished as age increases. The second event, of equal importance, is
the shrinkage of the family. While in other societies the extended co-
habiting family may range through several generations, in our culture
one does not live with parents much beyond puberty. Cut off from
income by loss of employment, taxed and inflated out of the value of
their savings, with children whose autonomy demands that they ap-
proach even the institution of marriage with great suspicion, the old are
simply catapulted into another world.
That world, familiar to other disadvantaged groups, is one of
poverty, food stamps obtained after filling out voluminous question-
aires, welfare payments given out in endless lines and on rude con-
ditions, obtrusive social workers, and often institutionalization. It
is the managed society. As one can in time become accustomed to vir-
tually any societal conditions-there is in fact a generation of govern-
mentally created welfare clients-one can expect to find a number of
people who have learned to live with and appreciate the security of be-
ing public charges. Some merely continue this status through old age.
Most of the old, however, the nouveau pauvre, lack this "education."
For them it is the first time in a food stamp line, the first time on wel-
fare, the first time in a public institution. Most old persons join the
managed state only after a lifetime of freedom. The price for entry
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1972); cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
372 (1971); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
4. Cf. M. HIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME If 51 (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson ed.
1962).
5. See generally S. DEBEAuVIOR, TlE COMING oF AGE 216 (1972), reviewed, Mur-
phy, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 546 (1975).
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is high-life, liberty, and property. Let me comment briefly on that
price.
Life
The managed state, of course, never publicly concedes that its
ministrations might adversely affect the health, let alone the life of any
of its wards. Since the state spends a substantial portion of its resources
on the "welfare" of wards, the only question it chooses to ask is how
well it has enhanced life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Two
groups, the Community Services Society of New York and the Ben-
jamin Rose Institute, had the temerity to check more fundamental
premises. Their first report on the success of services intended to en-
hance the life expectancy for the aged in New York is instructive:
According to [the] criterion [for measuring the effectiveness of the
program] two events have to occur in combination for the service
to be considered successful: a) more of the service participants
and controls had to survive, and b) among the survivors, the ser-
vice participants had to be more contented. Because the first
event did not occur, the criterion could not be met regardless of
what the showing might have been on the second.
One must conclude on the basis of data gathered . . . [that]
the project . . . was not effective in preventing death nor was it
effective in slowing down deterioration in physical functioning-
two major reasons frequently given for intervening in a protective
case .... 6
Liberty
One of the significant features of the Rose protective program was
placement. Thirty percent of the individuals in the study group lived
in institutions.7  The report indicates a recognition that among the
aged, institutionalization, wryly described by its victims as "being
planted," is a very unpopular solution to their problem. The project's
legal counsel, who provided legal services in eight guardianship cases,
made these observations:
Each case presented a problem which could only be solved by the
appointment of a guardian. In each instance the appointment by
the court was completely routine. No one at the court ever ques-
tioned anyone about the reasons for the guardianship nor was any
investigation ever made. Neither Judge - nor Judge
participated in any of the proceedings . . . . I say these things
6. BENJAmIN ROSE INSrrUTE, PROGRESS REPORT ON PROTECME SER IcES FOR
OLDER PEoPLE 68-69 (1967).
7. Id. at 25-26.
1975]
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not by way of criticism of our probate court, but only so you can
understand the tremendously impersonal manner in which matters
of this kind are handled in the court.8
The results of a study a colleague and I made in upstate New York
completely support these observations, 9 and similar confirmation comes
from a study of California conservatorship provisions by the ENKI Re-
search Group. In discussing geriatric services the ENKI group noted:
Some mentally disordered patients were placed involuntarily
in locked facilities under the diagnosis of chronic brain syndrome
and were not provided the opportunity for judicial review of the
involuntary hold. Locked facilities licensed by the state were gen-
erally used to provide care for the geriatric, senile patient who
would otherwise wander out into the community, and needed a pro-
tective setting to prevent harm from coming to him because of his
condition of incompetency. The diagnosis of chronic brain syn-
drome was considered to be an irreversible condition from which
a patient would not "clear" or improve. A number of profes-
sional persons were concerned that the mentally disordered were
being placed in locked facilities and forgotten rather than being
placed in a protective, but not locked, facility, such as a board-and-
care home.10
Though some of the provisions of the mental health laws were de-
signed to protect society or to protect persons from themselves, the con-
servatorship provisions were intended only to assist the gravely dis-
abled. That being true, the fact that the law results in cavalier inva-
sions of their rights is particularly objectionable."
It is unfortunate that statutes are drafted so as to allow medical
discretion'2 and that medical discretion is very often exercised by deal-
8. Id. at 37.
9. See G. ALmANDER & T. LEwrN, THE AGED AND THE NEEU FOR SUROATE MAN-
AGEMENT (1972); Alexander, Deutsch, Kovner & Levine, Surrogate Management of the
Property of the Aged, 21 SYRAcUSE L. Rnv. 87 (1969).
10. ENKI RESEACH INsTrruTE, A STUDY OF CALIFoRNIA's NEW MENTAL HEALTH
LAw 159 (1972).
11. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2490 (1975).
12. E.g., ARz. RV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5401 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974), provides:
Upon petition ... the court may appoint a conservator or make other protec-
tive order for cause as follows:
2. Appointment of a conservator... may be made in relation to the estate
and affairs of a person if the court determines that both(a) The person is unable to manage his property and affairs effectively for
reasons such as mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or
disability, advanced age ....(b) The person has property which will be wasted or dissipated unless
proper management is provided ....
For discussion of some of the problems of medical and psychiatric testimony in incompe-
tency proceedings, see G. ALEXANDER & T. LEWIN, supra note 9, at 15-27; Comment, Ap-
pointment of Guardians for the Mentally Incompetent, 1964 DU=n L.J. 341 (1964);
Leifer, The Competence of the Psychiatrist to Assist in the Determination of Incompe-
(Vol. 17
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ing with the physical management of the ward rather than his or her
needs. Yet, the deprivation of liberty that accompanies entry into the
managed state is not limited to the grossest invasions occasioned by
physical restraint. The price exacted of a person who becomes de-
pendent on the state after a lifetime of productivity includes personal
dignity-the requirement that he or she conform to the lifestyle
selected by the government. One element of that lifestyle is idleness.
Since the earliest decisions which attempted to define the parameters
of the "liberty" protected by the fifth and 14th amendments, the right
to work, to pursue one's livelihood, has been recognized as an essen-
tial component of that liberty.13 The right to work, however, is not
extended to the aged. First, the protection of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 196714 evaporates as soon as the worker reaches
65.1r This cutoff date, however, is harmonious with the more insid-
ious enforcement of idleness under the social security laws.16  The so-
called retirement test punishes the social security recipient who resists
idleness by reducing the benefits he receives if he earns more than
$2,400 per year.' 7  The result of the retirement test is simultaneously
to devalue an older person's labor and make it more difficult for him
or her to augment social security payments in order to obtain a higher
standard of living.
Deprivation of the liberty to pursue one's calling is but a part of
a larger pattern of life-style control which is triggered upon entry into
the managed state. The classic example is found in Wilkie v.
O'Connor.'8 Dissatisfied with the living arrangements of Mr. Wilkie,' 9
an old age assistance recipient, the local welfare commissioner discon-
tinued payments to him. The language of the court, responding to Mr.
Wilkie's claim that how he lived was none of the commissioner's busi-
ness, is reflective of the extreme deprivations of liberty common in the
managed state:
tency: A Sceptical Inquiry into the Courtroom Functions of Psychiatrists, 14 SYRACUSEL. Ray. 564 (1963).13. E.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 97 (1872) (Field, J., dis-
senting); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870); Stockton Laundry
Case, 26 F. 611, 613 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886). Although this line of cases construed the
privileges and immunities clauses, these rights have been found to be within the protec-
tion of the due process clauses. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972), recently reaffirmed that the right
to work is included within the concept of liberty.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IIr, 1973), 29 U.S.C.A. §§
630(b), 634 (1975). For further discussion of this Act, see Note, Proving Discrimina-
tion Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 17 Amz. L. REv. 495 (1975).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1970).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-431 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972, Supp. I1, 1973).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 403(f)-(g) (1970), as amended, (Supp. 11, 1973).
18. 261 App. Div. 373, 25 N.Y.S.2d 617 (App. Div. 1941).
19. Concededly, Mr. Wilkie's habits were somewhat peculiar. He slept "under an
old barn, in a nest of rags to which he [had] to crawl on his hands and knees." Id. at
374, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
1975]
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Appellant. . .argues that he has a right to live as he pleases while
being supported by public charity. One would admire his inde-
pendence if he were not so dependent, but he has no right to defy
the standards and conventions of civilized society while being sup-
ported at public expense. This is true even though some of those
conventions may be somewhat artificial. . . . It is true, as appel-
lant argues, that the hardy pioneers of our country slept in beds
not [sic] better than the one he has chosen. But, unlike the
appellant,. . . they did not call upon the public to support them,
while doing it.20
Property
A final deprivation is the loss by a number of old people of the right
to manage their property. Since surrogate management of one's prop-
erty is a normal price for living in the managed state, the fact should
come as no surprise. What is surprising is that it applies to many
people whose funds would otherwise suffice to keep them independent.
Stripping old people of their wealth must, of course, be justified in some
way since it would otherwise appear harsh. The approved method is
to claim that the individual involved is no longer properly able to
manage his property, and the state, with earnest solicitude, provides a
substitute who can manage it better.21
One need not go back far in our history to find even more cavalier
treatment. Then, one simply lumped old people with those accused
of mental illness under statutes generally applying to lunatics. 2  In
other instances, the aged might be placed in mental institutions simply
because there were no other available facilities. A number of states
have now changed the provisions by which the aged are deprived of
their property from lunacy proceedings to conservatorship proceed-
ings. 23  That prevents labeling the ward crazy-and still provides an
20. Id. at 375, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
21. The most common statutory standard is simply inability of the potential ward
to manage his property adequately without assistance. E.g., Amz. Rav. STAT. ANN.§ 14-5401 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1460, 1751 (West Supp. 1975);
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-401(2). There is considerable disagreement as to what
constitutes such disability, but courts have held that it is not necessary to show that the
alleged incompetent has performed acts which have dissipated his estate; it is sufficient
that he evidence conduct which would indicate the likelihood of such results. In re
Guardianship of Tyrrell, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 337, 92 Ohio L. Abs. 253 (P. Ct.), af!d, No.
42 (Ohio Ct. App., Oct. 31, 1962), appeal dismissed mem., 174 Ohio St. 552, 190 N.E.
2d 687 (1963). See generally Comment, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary
Guardianship: Have the Elderly Freedom to Spend?, 73 YALE L.J 676 (1964).
22. See Otwell v. Haskins, 25 Ga. App. 219, 102 S.E. 839 (1919); BEREZEN &
STOTSKy, THE GERIATRIC PATIENT IN THE PRACTICE OF COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH
220 (1970).
23. E.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5101, -5303 (Spec. Pamphlet 1974); CAL.
PROB. CODE §§ 1460, 1701, 1751 (West Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 112-
113 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1008 (Supp. 1974).
[Vol. 17
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efficient means for passing the property out of the ward's hands. In-
herent in the change of statutory language is recognition of the often:
devastating impact of labeling persons insane. Quite aside from the
stigmatizing effect of such a label and its consequent dehumanizing of
the person labeled, the characterization tends to carry with it certain
inevitable consequences wholly unrelated to. the goals of surrogate
management of the property of the aged, the most horrendous of which
is institutionalization. It should suffice to note with relief the move-
ment away from the use ,of the concept of mental illness in providing
surrogate management of the property of the aged.24 This trend does
not negate the other consequences of conservatorship, however.
The principal question in any conservatorship or guardianship pro-
ceeding is whether it is in the best interest of the ward. However benev-
olent the intention of those who would seek a substitute decisionmaker
for the aged, persons deprived of the right to decide for themselves will,
of course, have lost a fairly basic attribute of citizenship-the right to
manage their property. Our political and societal institutions take
money very seriously. It is not an accident that the threshold invasion
of individual liberty is the right to manage property, always on the the-
ory that what is being done is in the interest of the individual. The
right question, however, is not how one can maximize the financial
benefit to the potential ward; it is how one can reduce to a minimum
the invasion of his property rights. And that question is rarely asked.
Once the problem has been framed in this way, one is compelled to
inquire whose interest is really being served by appointment of a surro-
gate manager for the property of the aged. There is, of course, one sense
in which imposing a surrogate on an aged person is in that persons in-
terest. Certainly, courts can find professional property managers
capable of handling an individual's financial affairs in a superior
manner. But this is merely a specific application of a general rule:
one can always find people of greater skill and capacity in any given
specialization. Is our legal process so unerring that decisions of this
nature should be entrusted to it? Is such paternalistic supervision truly
desirable? Let us not forget that if a person feels that he needs a
manager for his property nothing prevents him from contracting for
these services.25 But when that surrogate is involuntarily imposed, I
for one am quite skeptical of the advantages to the potential ward. Al-
24. See generally Effland, Caring for the Elderly Under the Uniform Probate
Code, 17 AiLz. L. REv. 373 (1975).
25. A number of states have statutes providing for court appointment of a guardian
or conservator on voluntary request by an aged person. E.g., CAL. PROD. CODE § 1751
(West Supp. 1975); IowA CODE ANN. § 633.572 (Supp. 1975-76); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
59-3007 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, § 890.1 (Supp. 1974-75).
1975] "':FOREWORD
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though his wealth may increase, unless he retains the power to spend
his money to maximize his own enjoyment, the ward is not likely to
perceive his solvency as a benefit of any great magnitude.
Conclusion
The aged, like all other persons, have a right to life, liberty, and
property. I suggest that they should be allowed continued manage-
ment of their own property-a right that necessarily includes mis-
management. Additionally, state assistance, which has been earned by
a long life of citizenship, should not be obtained at the price of manip-
ulation by the managed state. In short, the state should allow the old
the luxury of simply getting their retirement income and otherwise
being left alone.
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